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Abstract—Convolution Neural Network (ConvNet) offers a
high potential to generalize input data. It has been widely
used in many application areas, such as visual imagery, where
comprehensive learning datasets are available and a ConvNet
model can be well trained and perform the required function
effectively. ConvNet can also be applied to network intrusion
detection. However, the currently available datasets related to
the network intrusion are often inadequate, which makes the
ConvNet learning deficient, hence the trained model is not
competent in detecting unknown intrusions. In this paper, we
propose a ConvNet model using transfer learning for the network
intrusion detection. The model consists of two concatenated
ConvNets and is built on a two-stage learning process: learning
a base dataset and transferring the learned knowledge to the
learning of the target dataset. Our experiments on the NSL-
KDD dataset show that the proposed model can improve the
detection accuracy not only on the test dataset containing mostly
known attacks (KDDTest+) but also on the test dataset featuring
many novel attacks (KDDTest-21) – about 2.68% improvement
on KDDTest+ and 22.02% on KDDTest-21 can be achieved, as
compared to the traditional ConvNet model.
Keywords—Network Intrusion Detection, ConvNet, Data Defi-
ciency
I. INTRODUCTION
ConvNet, as an effective deep learning solution for large
scale data processing, has attracted increasingly attentions.
More and more successful designs have been developed for
varied applications, such as image recognition, text classifica-
tion, and data extraction and regression.
ConvNet can also be applied to the network intrusion
detection (NID). There are trillions of network transections
and thousands of intrusions on the network each day. Each
month, new attacks are created. With the increasing scale of
the network and explosive number of users, the threats are
growing. Therefore, it is ultimately important to have a design
that can effectively capture all attacks in time.
So far, the ConvNet research for the network intrusion
detection has mainly focused on learning algorithms. However,
the quality of the datasets used in training ConvNet is also
important, but has not drawn much attentions. According
to [1], a significant number of researches on NID are still
based on the original DARPA (1998-1999) and KDD 1999
datasets. These training and test datasets are highly redundant
and contain many potential pitfalls [2], [3], which makes the
validation of the designs not very convincible.
Furthermore, even if a non-redundant dataset is used, a
learning algorithm can demonstrate quite different perfor-
mance on different test datasets. We have run an experiment
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Fig. 1: Large Performance Discrepancy of A Typical ConvNet
to train a typical ConvNet model on the non-redundant NSL-
KDD dataset. Fig. 1 shows the attack detection accuracies
of the model that validate on two different test datasets:
KDDTest+ and KDDTest-21. As can be seen from the figure,
the model performs poorly on KDDTest-21.
We believe a major reason causing such an inferior per-
formance is that the model is not sufficiently trained due to
data deficiency of the training dataset. A large portion of
data in KDDTest-21 are attacks that are not covered in the
training set of NSL-KDD [3]. Unfortunately, this situation
of data deficiency in model training is quite common in
practice, particularly for networks, where the attack types keep
growing and evolving. How to build a ConvNet model on a
limited learning dataset such that the model can perform
intelligently and efficiently to detect network intrusions,
both known and new? This is the question we try to answer
in this paper.
Our solution to this problem is first gaining basic knowledge
from some existing base dataset and learning the target dataset
based on the acquired knowledge.
The contributions of our work are summarized as follows:
1) To our best knowledge, we are the first to address the
issue of training data deficiency in using ConvNet for
network intrusion detection.
2) We introduce a knowledge-transfer based ConvNet
model, TL-ConvNet. The model consists of two con-
catenated ConvNets. The first ConvNet holds the basic
knowledge of network intrusions while the second one
possesses the knowledge more specific to the target
attack model.
3) We propose a novel training scheme to acquire the basic
knowledge of network intrusions from a base dataset and
train TL-ConvNet for the target dataset in two learning
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stages.
4) We build an experimental platform for the TL-ConvNet
development and evaluation. Our experiment results
demonstrate that the model is not only efficient in
detecting known attacks but also much more effective in
identifying new attacks that were not seen in the training
dataset.
The rest of paper is organized as follows: Our TL-ConvNet
model is presented in Section II where the model structure
and the training scheme are discussed. The experiments and
results are given in Section III and a comparison to the
related work on network intrusion detections can be found in
Section IV. The paper is concluded in Section V.
II. TL-CONVNET MODEL
The intrusion attacks on the network can be performed in
numerous and unforeseeable formats. Hence, the signatures of
attack may not be easily captured and effectively represented
manually. However, a good data representation is critical to the
final neural network (NN) created. Therefore, in our design,
we use ConvNet (Convolution Network). The convolution
operation in the ConvNet offers a powerful capability to extract
high-level features of attack payloads and generate an effective
representation of raw data automatically.
Similar to other machine learning models, a ConvNet is
trained on a training dataset and tested on a test dataset.
We assume our ConvNet design targets a network intrusion
model that contains known and novel attacks. We call the
related training dataset target dataset, and we regard the
attacks covered by the training dataset known attacks and
those that appear only in the test dataset but not the training
dataset novel attacks.
For our knowledge-transfer based ConvNet design, we fur-
ther assume that there is an extra dataset that was created
through a different data collection system and may have a
different intrusion model. We use this dataset to pre-train our
ConvNet model and the dataset is called base dataset.
The design of our TL-ConvNet Model is elaborated in the
next three subsections.
A. Model Structure
The general structure of the TL-ConvNet model is shown in
Fig. 2(a). It contains two concatenated ConvNets (ConvNet-B
and ConvNet-T) and a fully-connected net as an output layer.
The combined two ConvNets is also named as ConvNet-TL.
Each ConvNet of ConvNet-TL in turn contains multiple
(typically two) ConvNet layers, as shown in Fig. 2(b), and each
ConvNet layer is further constructed with three computation
layers (as can often be observed in a typical ConvNet design):
Convolution, Pooling, and Dropout (see Fig. 2(c)).
The convolution can be performed on 1D or multiple
dimension data, depending on applications. For the network
intrusion, the data items in the dataset often come from
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Fig. 2: Structures: (a) TL-ConvNet Model; (b) ConvNet; (c)
ConvNet Layer.
network packets and readily presented in vectors. Therefore,
it is straightforward to use 1D convolution in our design1.
Pooling in the ConvNet layer down-samples the output
from the convolution. It can select the most active and useful
features of the data to facilitate the next step learning [4].
Dropout is randomly (on a fixed probability) to remove
some connections from the NN layer to reduce possible
overfitting that leads to degraded performance on the test
dataset [5]. We therefore, include those computing layers for
the base structure of the ConvNet.
The output layer maps the ConvNet-TL results to the final
output. Generally, the output layer contains a fully-connected
net with an activation function to amplify the result.
We want to train the model for high attack detection
accuracy on both known and novel attacks, which is explained
below.
B. Model Training
The overview of training platform for TL-ConvNet Model
is given in Fig. 3(a).
It contains two main training stages: Stage-1 learning and
Stage-2 learning. Like in all NN trainings, the learning is
iterations of the net tuning for a target computing function.
Stage-1 learning trains ConvNet-B on the base dataset,
B. The learning on the dataset aims to extract sufficient
knowledge to help the learning of target dataset.
After ConvNet-B has been trained, the second ConvNet,
ConvNet-T, is added to form a whole ConvNet-TL model for
Stage-2 learning. In Stage-2 learning, ConvNet-B is fixed and
only ConvNet-T is specifically trained on the target dataset,
T .
Once the training is converged with a stable detection
accuracy, the model is finally built.
It must be pointed out that when training a ConvNet,
an output layer (Fully Connected Layer) should be used to
generate results for evaluation.
1Some existing designs such as [14] convert the raw data into images,
which, we believe, is not necessary and may even introduce unexpected data
loss.
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Since no data collection system is perfect and the available
raw data may not follow the ConvNet input format, the
collected raw data should be preprocessed, as indicated in Fig.
3(a) for each learning stage.
During the data preprocessing, data items with missing
values are repaired with patches and all data are then converted
into numerical values via encoding; The values are further
scaled (standardized) to enhance the learning efficiency. Fi-
nally, the resulting data are reshaped into the format required
for the ConvNet operation, as outlined in Fig. 3(b).
C. Transferability
One important issue with our TL-ConvNet model is how
to ensure proper knowledge to be transferred from Stage-1
learning to Stage-2.
For a ConvNet training, often the learning accuracy in-
creases with the training time, as demonstrated in Fig. 4. We
regard the knowledge gained during the early learning period
is foundational. As the training progresses, the model gains
more advanced knowledge about the training dataset, hence
achieving higher learning accuracy.
For our TL-ConvNet model, similar to some situations
of using transfer learning for image classification [6], the
advanced knowledge to the base dataset may not be much
relevant to the target dataset and may even adversely affect
the learning accuracy of the overall model. Therefore, a small
training time should be set to control its transferability.
Other parameters required for the TL-ConvNet training need
to be further tuned for a good training result, which will be
covered in the next section.
III. EXPERIMENTS AND RESULTS
We built an evaluation platform on the HP EliteDesk 800
G2 SFF Desktop with Intel (R) Core (TM) i5-6500 CPU @
3.20 GHz processor and 16.0 GB RAM. The ConvNet models
are implemented based on the TensorFlow backend, and the
frontend Keras and scikit-learn packages.
A. Datasets and Threat Models
Our TL-ConvNet model targets NSL-KDD dataset. As
mentioned earlier, it has two test datasets: KDDTest+ and
KDDTest-21.
For the base dataset, we chose the UNSW-NB15 dataset.
UNSW-NB15 is a non-redundant dataset with many contempo-
rary attacks. Compared with its preceding intrusion detection
datasets, it has a balanced distribution between normal and
attack data items [7], [8]. There is no separate test dataset for
UNSW-NB15. We, therefore, partitioned the dataset for both
training and testing purposes.
The threat models formed by the datasets (UNSW-NB15,
NSL-KDD for training, and NSL-KDD for testing) are shown
in Table I. As can be seen from the table, NSL-KDD and
UNSW-NB15 have different threat models and there are 17
types of novel attacks in the test dataset of NSL-KDD.
We also investigated the attacks distributed in the datasets
used in our experiment. Table II shows the number of data
items that are normal (Column 2) and the number of attacks
(Column 3) in each dataset. The percentage of attacks in each
dataset is given in Column 4 and the last column shows the
percentage only for novel attacks. As can be seen from the
table, KDDTest-21 contains relatively more novel attacks –
about a third of data in KDDTest-21 are novel attacks.
For the input raw data, we combined the data fields of the
UNSW-NB15 and NSL-KDD datasets. After preprocessing,
each sample data in the two datasets is a vector of 113 values.
B. Experimental Results
Following the training procedure given in Fig. 3(a), we
carried out the training on different configuration settings by
exploring the space of parameters. The final configurations for
the TL-ConvNet training are summarized in Table III.
TABLE I: THREAT MODELS
DATASET ATTACK TYPES
UNSW-NB15 ANALYSIS, BACKDOOR, DoS, EXPLOITS, FUZZERS, GENERIC, RECONNAISSANCE, SHELLCODE, WORMS.
NSL-KDD(TRAIN) BACK, LAND, NEPTUNE, POD, SMURF, TEARDROP, SATAN, IPSWEEP, NMAP, PORTSWEEP, GUESS PASSWD,
FTP WRITE, IMAP, PHF, MULTIHOP, WAREZMASTER, WAREZCLIENT, SPY, BUFFER OVERFLOW, LOADMODULE,
ROOTKIT, PERL.
NSL-KDD(TEST) BACK, LAND, NEPTUNE, POD, SMURF, TEARDROP, SATAN, IPSWEEP, NMAP, PORTSWEEP, GUESS PASSWD,
FTP WRITE, IMAP, PHF, MULTIHOP, WAREZMASTER, WAREZCLIENT, SPY, BUFFER OVERFLOW, LOADMODULE,
ROOTKIT, PERL, APACHE2, MAILBOMB, PROCESSTABLE, UDPSTORM, SNMPGETATTACK, SNMPGUESS, NAMED,
WORM, SENDMAIL, SQLATTACK, HTTPTUNNEL, XTERM, PS, XLOCK, XSNOOP, MSCAN, SAINT.
TABLE II: STATISTIC OF DATASETS
DATASET NORMAL ATTACK % of % of
ATTACK NOVEL ATTACK
UNSW-NB15 93,000 164,673 63.9 -
KDDTrain+ 67,343 58,630 46.5 -
KDDTest+ 9,711 12,833 56.9 17.3
KDDTest-21 2,152 9,698 81.8 32.8
TABLE III: TRAINING CONFIGURATIONS
ConvNet layer1 layer2 Pooling Dropout learningrate
batch
size
learning
time
ConvNet-B 256 512 Max 0.5 0.001 400 1
ConvNet-T 8 16 Max 0.5 0.001 1100 100
In our experiments, all ConvNets have two ConvNet layers.
For ConvNet-B, the number of outputs (convolution filters) for
layer 1 is 256 and for layer 2 is 512. The Pooling in each layer
uses the Max pooling function and the Dropout uses 0.5 as the
retaining probability. The training is performed on a learning
rate of 0.001, batch size of 400, and learning time (epoch) is
1 as shown in the second row of Table III. The configuration
for ConvNet-T is given in the last row.
Based on the training configurations in Table III, we used
10-fold cross-validation on the UNSW-NB15 for training
ConvNet-B . To see how effective of foundational knowledge
transfer, we also investigated the model when ConvNet-B was
fully trained with advanced knowledge of UNSW-NB15.
For evaluation we also trained other two models and
validated on KDDTest+ and KDDTest-21 respetively. The
detection rate (DR%), accuracy (ACC%), and false predic-
tion rate (FPR%) for the design without knowledge transfer
(simply named as ConvNet), with the advanced knowledge
transfer (named as TL-ConvNet*) and with the foundational
knowledge transfer (TL-ConvNet) are given in the Table IV.
The table shows the superiority of the foundational knowledge
transfer design almost 99.82% attacks in the KDDTest-21
can be detected. Majority of them are novel attacks. With
our experiments, after transferring foundational knowledge,
the TL-ConvNet could correctly detect 12,045 out of 12,833 on
the KDDTest+ and 9,680 out of 9,698 attacks on the KDDTest-
21. Compared with the traditional ConvNet, our method can
improve the accuracy around 2.68% on the KDDTest+ and
22.02% on the KDDTest-21.
TABLE IV: A COMPARISON OF KNOWLEDGE TRANS-
FER WITH NON-TRANSFER
Model KDDTest+ KDDTest-21
DR% ACC% FPR% DR% ACC% FPR%
ConvNet 78.35 84.62 7.11 54.36 59.92 15.06
TL-ConvNet* 56.25 71.98 7.22 41.99 46.82 31.41
TL-ConvNet 93.86 87.30 21.38 99.82 81.94 98.65
Although TL-ConvNet can significantly improve the overall
accuracy, it must be pointed that, TL-ConvNet presents a high
false alarm rate (21.38%) on the KDDTest+ and (98.65%) on
KDDTest-21. The unusual phenomenon is mainly caused by
the inherent drawback of NSL-KDD data set, which are the
uneven distribution and high attack density (51.9% and 81.8%)
in two test sets.
IV. A COMPARISON OF RELATED WORK
There have been many machine-learning based designs pro-
posed. For the network intrusion detection, the classification
algorithms are mostly relevant. Some typical ones are J48,
Naive Bayes, NBTree, Random Forest (RF), Random Tree
(RT), Multi Layer Perception (MLP) and Support Vector
Machine (SVM). Their detection accuracies on the NSL-KDD
dataset have been evaluated in [3], as copied in Table V (the
first seven entries in the table). From the table, we can see
that among all the seven algorithms, NBTree has a highest
performance (with an accuracy of 82.02%).
One problem with these classical designs is their limited
ability of data generalization and hence restricted performance
[9]. To achieve a better performance, researchers have recently
turned to deep learning. One deep learning model is the
recurrent neural network (RNN) [10] proposed by Y. Chuan-
long. The model has a low false prediction rate. Another
neural network mostly studied is the ConvNet. [11]–[16]. In
[15], Lin et al. presented a character-level ConvNet (Char-
IDS) for intrusion detections, where network traffic data are
converted into characters before to be processed by the convo-
lution network. ReNet and GoogLeNet discussed in [16], also
use data conversion, but the conversion in the two designs
transforms the network traffic data into images in order to use
the existing ConvNet trained on an image dataset. Their model
for the network intrusion detection is then built on the trained
ConvNet and the knowledge learned from the image dataset
is transferred to the final model for the intrusion detection.
TABLE V: A COMPARISON OF RELATED WORK
Methods KDDTest+ KDDTest-21
DR% ACC% FPR% DR% ACC% FPR%
J48 [3] - 81.05 - - 63.97 -
NaiveBayes [3] - 76.56 - - 55.77 -
NBTree [3] - 82.02 - - 66.16 -
RF [3] - 80.67 - - 63.26 -
DT [3] - 81.59 - - 58.51 -
MLP [3] - 77.41 - - 57.34 -
SVM [3] - 69.52 - - 68.55 -
RNN [10] 72.95 83.28 0.03 - 68.55 -
Char-IDS [15] 81.12 85.07 9.71 - 72.27 -
ReNet50 [16] 69.41 79.14 0.08 99.63 81.57 99.81
GoogLeNet [16] 65.64 77.04 0.08 100 81.84 100
TL-ConvNet 93.86 87.30 21.38 99.82 81.94 98.65
* we use ’-’ indicates that those evaluation metrics are not given in related
literature.
Our TL-ConvNet is similar to ReNet, GoogLeNet in that we
also use an extra dataset to pre-train the ConvNet. However,
TL-ConvNet does not involve any data conversion to a dif-
ferent application domain. We believe that such a conversion
is not necessary in the presence of ConvNet since ConvNet
can learn well from the raw data, and most importantly, the
data conversion may lead to some data loss and eventually
degrade the learning efficiency. Furthermore, our design offers
a flexibility of transferring knowledge at different learning
level and we demonstrate that the design with the foundational
knowledge transferred is very effective. Compared with other
designs listed in Table V, our design has a highest detection
accuracy on each of the two test datasets: KDDTest+ and
KDDTest-21.
V. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we have addressed the problem with data
deficiency in ConvNet training for the network intrusion
detection. Existing machine learning based NID designs are
not effective to detect the novel attacks. We proposed a
knowledge transfer based ConvNet model that first learns the
basic knowledge about network intrusion from a base dataset.
Our experiment results on the NSL-KDD dataset shows that
our design not only improves the detection accuracy on its
KDDTest+ dataset but also greatly increases the detection
accuracy on the KDDTest-21 dataset, which demonstrates
that with the learned foundational knowledge, the model can
efficiently learn the target dataset and gain high capability to
identify novel attacks.
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